Given an aftermath of a cascade in the network, i.e. a set VI of "infected" nodes after an epidemic outbreak or a propagation of rumors/worms/viruses, how can we infer the sources of the cascade? Answering this challenging question is critical for computer forensic, vulnerability analysis, and risk management. Despite recent interest towards this problem, most of existing works focus only on single source detection or simple network topologies, e.g. trees or grids.
INTRODUCTION
The explosion of online social networks with billion of users such as Facebook or Twitter have fundamentally changed the landscapes of information sharing, nowadays. Unfortunately, the same channels can be exploited to spread rumors and misinformation that cause devastating effects such as widespread panic in the general public [1], diplomatic tensions [2] , and witch hunts towards innocent people [3] .
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Despite recent interest towards this problem, termed Infection Sources Identifications (ISI), most of existing works either limit to single source detection [24, 23] or simple network topologies, e.g. trees or grids, with ad hoc extensions to general graphs [21, 28, 29, 24] . A recent work in [27] provides an MDL-based method, called NETSLEUTH, to detect both the number of infection sources and the sources themselves. However the proposed heuristics seems to only work well for grid networks and cannot detect any true infection source. Thus there is lack of a rigorous and accurate method to detect multiple infection sources in general graphs.
In this paper, we present a new approach to identify multiple infection sources that looks into both infected and uninfected nodes. This contradicts to existing methods [21, 27] which limit the attention to the subgraph induced by the infected nodes. Given a snapshot of network G = (V, E) and a set of infected nodes VI , we identify the sources by searching for a setŜ that minimize the symmetric difference between the cascade from S and VI . While our objective, the symmetric difference, is similar to the one used in k-effector [21] , our novel formulation does not require the knowledge of the number of infection sources k. In deriving optimization method for this new approach, we face strong challenges in developing efficient solution:
• The non-submodular objective. Thus, it is inefficient to solve the problem through simple greedy methods.
• The stochastic nature of the infection process requires considering exponentially many possible cascades.
To tackle ISI, we propose SISI, an algorithm that can accurately detect infection sources. We employ in SISI two novel techniques: a Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling (TRIS) method to generate random reachability RR sets that encode the infection landscape and a primal-dual algorithm for the Submodular-cost Covering [19] . SISI, to our best knowledge, is the first algorithm with provable guarantee for multiple infection sources detection in general graphs. It returns an 2 (1− ) 2 ∆-approximate solution with a high probability, where ∆ denotes the maximum number of nodes in VI that may infect the same node in the network. Experiments on real-world networks show the huge leap of SISI in detecting true infection sources, boosting the true source discovery rates from merely few percents, for the state-ofthe-art NETSLEUTH, to more than 70%. Thus SISI has both high empirical performance and theoretical guarantees.
The advantages of SISI over other methods are illustrated through a cascade on a 60 × 60 grid in Fig. 1 . SISI is the only one which can detect the true infection sources. To avoid false negative, which is more serious than false positive, SISI often output slightly more infection sources than other methods (SISI: 3, NETSLEUTH: 1, Greedy:1, Groundtruth: 2). However, it maintains a reasonable F1-score of over 50%.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We propose a new approach to identify multiple infection sources through minimizing the symmetric difference between the cascade of the suspected source nodes S with the infected nodes VI without knowing the number of sources a priori. Our experiments show that methods following this approach including our algorithm SISI and the greedy algorithm outperform the other approaches in terms of detecting true sources.
• To our best knowledge, we propose the first approximation algorithm, termed SISI, for detecting multiple infection sources in general graphs and our algorithm does not require the knowledge on the number of infection sources. Given an approximation error > 0, we provide rigorous analysis on sample complexity, deriving the necessary number of samples to guarantee a multiplicative error (1± ) on the objective estimation.
• Extensive experiments on real-world networks shows the superiority of SISI over other approaches in detecting the exact sources under both SI and IC models. The relax version of SISI is also faster than NET-SLEUTH while still retaining high-quality solutions.
Related works. Infection Source Identification (ISI) under different names has recently emerged and attracted quite a number of researchers in multiple disciplines with diverse techniques. There are two main streams of works and methods that can be listed: 1) exact algorithms on tree graphs [28, 29, 24, 21, 12] , 2) ad hoc heuristics approaches without any guarantee for general graphs [27, 24, 23] .
In the first stream, Shah and Zaman in [28] established the notion of rumor-centrality which is an Maximum Likelihood estimator on regular trees under the SI model. They proposed an optimal algorithm to identify the single source of an epidemic. In [29] , the same authors improved the previous results by deriving the exact expression for the probability of correct detection. Later Luo et al. [24] based on approximations of the infection sequences count to develop an algorithm that can find at most two sources in a geometric tree. Since solely targeting trees, all these methods are unable of solving ISI problem on general graphs.
Lappas et al. [21] formulated ISI problem under the name of k-effector and introduced the minimization of the symmetric difference between the observed infection and the resulting cascade if starting from a candidate source set. While the formulation is novel, their solution is, unfortunately, limited to tree graphs and require the knowledge of the number of infection sources. The extension for general graphs by approximating a graph by a tree does not work well either as we show later in the experiment section.
Prakash et al. [27] resort to heuristic approach to find multiple sources in general graphs and propose NETSLEUTH which relies on the two-part code Minimum Description Length. They show that NETSLEUTH is able to detect both the sources and how many of them. However, besides no guarantee on solution quality, we show in our experiments that NETSLEUTH performs poorly on a simple grid graph with large overlapping region of cascades from two source nodes. Luo et al. [24] also derived an estimator to find multiple sources given that the maximum number of sources is provided. Yet similar to [21] , their estimator depends on the approximation of a general graph to tree and also requires the maximum number of sources.
There are also other works on related areas: [16] studies the rumor-centrality estimator on trees under an additional constraint that the status (infected or not) of a node is revealed with probability p ≤ 1. In case of p = 1, the estimator is able to reproduce the previous results and with large enough p < 1, it achieves performance within the optimal. Under a different model, Chen et al. [9] study the problem of detecting multiple information sources in networks under the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. They propose an estimator for regular trees that can detect sources within a constant distance to the real ones with high probability and investigate a heuristic algorithm for general cases. In another study [23] , Lokhov et al. take the dynamic messagepassing approach under SIR model and introduce an inference algorithm which is shown to admit good improvement.
Influence maximization problem [17] that find k nodes to maximize the expected influence is one of the most extensively studied problem. The latest references on the problem can be found in [32, 11, 26, 30] and the references therein.
Organization. We present our model and problem formulation in Section 2. The hardness and inapproximability results are provided in Section 2.3. The main algorithm SISI is proposed in Section 3 while its performance guarantees and running time are analyzed in Section 4. We provide comparison on empirical performance of our algorithms and other approaches in Section 5. Conclusions and extensions for other settings are discussed in Section 6.
MODELS AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
We represent the network in which the infection spreads as a directed graph G = (V, E) where V is the set of n nodes, e.g., computers in a computer network, and E is the set of m directed edges, e.g., connections between the computers.
In addition, we are given a subset VI ⊆ V of observed infected nodes and the remaining nodes are assumed to be not infected and denoted byVI = V \VI . Set of infected and uninfected nodes. β, k Infection probability and k = |V I |.
Symmetric different on a graph realization.
The returned source set of SISI. OP T, S *
The optimal value of E[D(S, τ )] and an optimal solution set which achieves the optimal value. R j , src(R j )
A random RR set and its source node src(R j ).
Infection Model
We focus on the popular Susceptible-Infected (SI) model. Susceptible-Infected (SI) model. In this infection model, each node in the network is in one of two states: 1) Susceptible (S) (not yet infected) and 2) Infected (I) (infected and capable of spreading the disease/rumor). Once infected, the node starts spreading to its neighbors through their connections. While the initial model were proposed for a complete graph topology [5] , the model can be extended for arbitrary graph G = (V, E). We assume that the infection spreads in discrete time steps. At time t = 0, a subset of nodes, called the infection sources, are infected and the rest is uninfected. Once a node u gets infected at time t, it will continuously try to infect its uninfected neighbor v and succeed with probability 0 < β ≤ 1 from step t + 1 onwards until successful. The single parameter β indicates how contagious the infection is and thus the higher, the faster it contaminates the network.
Other cascade model. In principle, our formulation and proposed method will work for most progressive diffusion models in which once a node becomes infected, it stays infected. These include the two popular models Independent Cascade IC and Linear Threshold (LT) models [17] . Other non-progressive models can be first converted to a progressive ones as outlined in [8] .
For simplicity, we present our method for the SI model and discuss the extension to the IC and LT models through changing the sampling method in Subsection 3.1.
Learning model parameters. Learning propagation model parameters is an important topic and has received a great amount of interest [18, 31, 15, 22, 20] . Our approaches can rely on these learning methods to extract influence cascade model parameters from real datasets, e.g., action logs, connection networks.
Problem Formulation
Intuitively, given an infection model, denoted by M, the goal of infection source identification is to identify a set of source nodes S (unknown size) so that the resulting cascade originated from nodes in S, within a duration τ > 0, matches VI as closely as possible.
To formalize the problem, we define a cascade V (S, M) as the set of infected nodes if we select nodes in S as the sources (initially infected) under infection model M. Thus, the objective function which characterizes the aforementioned criteria, termed symmetric difference, is defined as follows,
Figure 2: Illustration of symmetric difference.
In Eq. 1, the first term |VI \V (S, M)| counts the number of nodes in VI that are not infected by the propagation spreading from S within a duration τ and the second term indicates the number of nodes that are "mistakenly" infected during the same time interval (illustrated in Fig. 2 ). Together, the sum measures the similarity between the observed cascade VI and the cascade causes by the suspected nodes S.
Due to the stochastic nature of the cascade, there are exponentially many possible cascades for a given set of source nodes S. Here cascade is used to refer to the set of infected nodes within τ steps. To account for this, we aggregate the symmetric difference over the probabilistic space of the possible cascades spreading from S. Denote by Pr[V (S, M)], the probability of receiving a particular cascade V (S, M) within t = τ time steps. We compute the expected symmetric difference as follows,
Pr[v infected by S]
In the last equation, the 'infected' and 'not infected' probabilities are w.r.t. a random cascade from S within τ steps.
We now state the problem of identifying the infection sources as follows.
Definition 1 (Infection Sources Identification).
Given a graph G = (V, E), infection model M (e.g., β for SI model), observation set VI of infected nodes, and the duration of the cascade τ (could be infinity), the Infection Sources Identification (ISI) problem asks for a setŜ of nodes that, S = arg min
While this formulation is similar to [21] , we do not require knowledge on the number of infection sources.
Hardness and Inapproximability
This subsection shows the NP-hardness and inapproximability results of the ISI problem. From Def. 1, there are two major difficulties in finding the sources: 1) first, by a similar argument to that of the influence maximization problem in [17] , the objective function is #P-hard to compute exactly; 2) second, the objective is non-submodular, i.e., there are no easy greedy approaches to obtain approximation algorithms.
In fact, we show a stronger inapproximability result in the below theorem. Theorem 1. ISI cannot be approximated within a factor O(2 log 1− n ) for any > 0, where n = |V |, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n polylog(n) ).
For brevity, we provide the sketch of the proof and refer the details to the extended version of this paper in [4] . To prove Theo. 1, we construct a gap-preserving polynomialtime reduction which reduces any instance of the Red-Blue Set Cover problem [7] to an instance of ISI. The Red-Blue Set Cover problem is defined as follows: an instance of RedBlue Set Cover problem consists of two disjoint sets: R = {r1, ..., rp} of red elements, B = {b1, ..., bq} of blue elements, and a family T ⊆ 2 R∪B of n subsets of R ∪ B. The problem asks a subfamily C * ⊆ T of subsets that covers all the blue elements but minimum number of reds,
Our polynomial reduction ensures that if the ISI instance has an O(2 log 1− n )-approximate solution S, then there must be a corresponding O(2 log 1− n )-approximate solution of the Red-Blue Set Cover polynomially induced from S. The reduction is grounded on the observation that any solution of the Red-Blue Set Cover costs at most p -the number of red elements. Then, based on the result in [7] that the Red-Blue Set Cover cannot be approximated within a factor O(2 log 1− N ) where N = n 4 for any > 0 unless NP ⊆ DTIME(N polylog(N ) ), we obtain the Theorem 1.
SAMPLING-BASED SISI ALGORITHM
In this section, we present SISI, our sampling-based method with guarantee on achieving 2 (1− ) 2 ∆-approximation factor for arbitrary small > 0. Here ∆ equals the maximum nodes in VI that can infect a single node in the graph and is the same with the maximum sample size in Subsec. 3.1.
Outline. SISI contains two key components: 1) an efficient Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling (TRIS) to compute the objective with high accuracy and confidentiality (presented in Subsection 3.1) and 2) an innovative transformation of the studied problem into a submodular-cost covering problem to provide high quality solutions with performance guarantees (presented in Subsection 3.2). We show the combination of the two components to obtains the SISI algorithm in Subsection 3.3.
Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling
We propose the Truncated Reverse Infection Sampling (TRIS) strategy to generate random Reverse Reachable (RR) sets, following the reverse influence sampling method (RIS) pioneered in [6] . A RR set, Rj, is generated as follows.
Definition 2 (Reverse Reachable set (RR set)). Given G = (V, E), probability β and propagation time τ , a RR set is generated from G by 1) selecting a (uniformly) random source node v ∈ V , 2) generating a reverse random cascade from v in G within τ steps and 3) returning Rj as the set of nodes in the cascade.
The main intuition is that each RR set Rj contains the nodes that can infect its source v = src(Rj) within a given time τ . Thus RR sets were used in previous works [6, 32, 25] (without the step/time limit t) to estimate influence of nodes. We shall show later in next subsection that RR sets can also be fine-tuned to estimate the chance of being infection sources.
Note that the above description of generating RR sets is model-independent, i.e., you can use it with many different cascade models for reverse cascade simulation in the step 2. For example, the reverse simulation for IC and LT, the two most popular cascades models, are presented in [6] and [4] , respectively. Here we focus on the reverse sampling for SI model and highlight the necessary changes to make the method work for our problem.
Generating RR Sets under SI model.
The main difference between SI model vs. LT and IC models are SI model allows multiple attempts for an infected node to its neighbors in contrast to a single attempt in IC and LT. Given a network G = (V, E) and infection probability 0 < β ≤ 1, RR sets in the SI model are generated as follows. 1) Select a random node u. Only u is infected at time 0 and all other nodes are not infected.
2) For each time step i ∈ [1, τ ], consider all edges (u, v) ∈ E in which v is infected and u is not infected (note the direction). Toss a β-head biased coin to determine whether u succeeds in infecting v. If the coin gives head (with a probability β), we mark u as infected.
3) After τ steps, return Rj as the set of infected nodes, removing all nodes that are not in VI .
Note the last step, the nodes that are not in VI will be removed from the RR set (hence the name truncated). This truncation is due to the observation that the suspected nodes must be among nodes in VI . Our RR sets are in general smaller than that in [6] and might be empty. This saves us a considerable amount of memory in storing the RR sets.
Algorithm 1: Fast-TRIS Input: Graph G, probability β, max time τ and VI Output: A random RR set Rj 1 Pick a random node u ∈ V 2 RR set Rj = {u} 3 Infection time T {v} = ∞, ∀v ∈ V \{u}, T {u} = 0 4 Min priority queue P Q = {u} 5 while P Q not empty do
18 Return Rj A naive implementation of the above reserve sampling has a high complexity and does not scale when τ grows, thus we present a fast implementation using geometric distribution in Algorithm 1.
The complete pseudocode for the fast TRIS algorithm is described in Alg. 1. The key observation to speed up the TRIS procedure is that each trial in the sequence of infection attempts is a Bernoulli experiment with success probability of β. Thus this sequence of attempts until successful actually follows a geometric distribution. Instead of tossing the Bernoulli coin many times until getting a head, we can toss once and use the geometric distribution to determine the number of Bernoulli trials until successful (Lines 8,9) .
Another issue is the order of attempts since a node can be infected from any of her in-neighbors but only the earliest one counts. Therefore, we will keep the list of all newly infected nodes in a min priority queue (PQ) w.r.t infection time. In each iteration, the top node is considered (Lines 6). The algorithm behaves mostly like the legacy Dijkstra's algorithm [14] except we have time for a node w to infect a node v on each edge (w, v) instead of the length. Also, the algorithm is constrained within the region consisting of nodes at most 'distance' τ from the selected u.
The time complexities of the naive and fast implementation of TRIS are stated in the following lemma with the proof in our extended version [4] . Lemma 1. Expected time complexity of the naive TRIS is,
and that of the fast implementation is,
Thus, the running time C (Rj) of our fast implementation is roughly τ times smaller than that C(Rj) of the naive implementation, especially, for large values of τ .
Chance of Being Infection Sources
We show how to utilize the generated RR sets to estimate the chance that nodes are infection sources. First, we classify each generated RR Rj into one of the two groups, based on the source of Rj (denoted by src(Rj)):
• R Blue = {Rj|src(Rj) ∈ VI }: The set of blue RR sets whose sources are in VI .
• R Red = {Rj|src(Rj) / ∈ VI }: The set of red RR sets whose sources are not in VI .
Since the infection sources infect the nodes in VI but not the nodes outside of VI (within time τ ), thus, the infection sources should appear frequently in blue RR sets (whose sources are in VI ) and appear infrequently in red RR sets (whose sources are not in VI .) Thus, a node v that appear in many blue RR and few red RR sets will be more likely to be among the infection sources.
The above observation can be generalized for a given a subset of nodes S ⊂ VI , e.g., a subset of suspected nodes. A subset S that covers (i.e. to intersect with) many blue RR sets and few red RR sets will be more likely to be the infection sources.
Define the following two subgroups of RR sets R − Blue (S) = {Rj|Rj ∈ R Blue and Rj ∩ S=∅}, and
R + Red (S) = {Rj|Rj ∈ R Red and Rj ∩ S =∅}.
They are the blue RR sets that a suspected subset S "fails" to cover (i.e. to intersect with) and the red RR sets that S ("mistakenly") covers. The less frequent a random RR set Rj falls into one of those two subgroups, the more likely S will be the infection sources. Formally, we can prove that the probability of a random RR set falls into one of those two subgroups equals exactly our objective function, denoted by E[D(Ŝ, τ, VI )]. We state the result in the following lemma and put the proof to our extended version in [4] .
Lemma 2. Given a fixed set S ∈ VI , for a random RR set Rj, denote Xj a random variable such that,
then,
Lem. 2 suggests a two-stages approach to identify the infection sources: 1) generating many RR sets and 2) look for a subset S ⊂ VI that minimize the size of |R − Blue (S) ∪ Rj ∈ R + Red (S)|. In next two subsections, we address two key issues of this approach 1) Optimization method to identify S with guarantees and 2) Sample complexity, i.e., how many RR sets is sufficient to generate a good solution. Too few RR sets lead to biased and poor solutions, while too many RR set lead to high running time.
Submodular-cost Covering
We will transform the ISI problem to a submodular-cost covering problem over the generated RR sets. This allows us to apply the ∆-approximation algorithm in [19] , where ∆ is the maximum size of any RR set.
By Lemma 2, the problem of minimizing E[D(S, M, VI )] can be cast as a minimization problem of Pr[Rj
. This, in turn, can be approximated with the following problem over the generated RR sets. min
and, since Rj ∈ R − Blue (S) and Rj ∈ R + Red (S) are disjoint, the above minimization problem is equivalent to
We shall convert the above problem to the submodularcost covering in [19] , stated as follows.
Definition 3 (Submodular-cost covering). [19] An instance is a triple (c, C, U ) where
• The cost function c(x) : R n ≥0 → R ≥0 is submodular, continuous, and non-decreasing.
• The constraint set C ⊆ 2 R ≥0 is a collection of covering constraints, where each constraint S ∈ C is a subset of R n ≥0 .
• For each j ∈ [n], the domain Uj for variable xj is any subset of R ≥0 .
The problem is to find x ∈ R n ≥0 , minimizing c(x) subject to xj ∈ Uj, ∀j ∈ [n] and x ∈ S, ∀S ∈ C.
Conversion to submodular-cost covering problem. We convert the form in Eq. 11 into a submodular-cost covering problem as demonstrated in Fig. 3 . Let q = |R Blue | and p = |R Red |. We associate a variable xu ∈ [0, 1] for each u ∈ VI to indicate whether the corresponding node is selected as an infected source. We also assign a variable yj to each RR set Rj ∈ R Blue . We require all blue RR Rj sets to be covered through the constraint max{maxu∈R j xu, yj} ≥ 1. Thus for each blue Rj either xv = 1 for some v ∈ Rj or the corresponding yj = 1.
The objective is to minimize the cost function minx,y c(x, y) = R j ∈R Red maxu∈R j (xu) + q j=1 yj. The first part of the cost function maxu∈R j (xu) is a submodular function since the max function is submodular (see footnote 1, page 2 in [19] ). The second part q j=1 yj is a linear function, and thus is also a submodular function. Therefore, the objective is a submodular function.
Thus, the problem in Eq. 11 can be converted to the following submodular-cost covering problem,
subject to (for each Rj ∈ R Blue ) max{max
Since for any assignment of variable set x, we have a corresponding source selection: node u is selected as infection source if xu = 1. The first term
in Eq. 12 is equivalent to |R + Red (S)| in Eq. 11 and similarly q j=1 yj together with the constraints is equivalent to |R − Blue (S)|. In Eq. 12, each covering constraint is associated with a blue RR set Rj and says that if Rj is not covered by any variable xu (xu = 1), then yj = 1 which will increase the cost function by 1. Thus, Eq. 12 minimizes the number of red RR sets covered and blue RR sets uncovered.
Algorithm 2: Submodular-cost-Covering Input: Infected set VI , collection of RR sets R Output: An ∆-approximate setŜ 1 Formulate the submodular cost covering version from R 2 xu = 0, ∀u ∈ VI and yj = 0, ∀j : Rj ∈ R Blue 3 foreach Rj ∈ R Blue do 4 θ = min ∆-Approximation Algorithm. Our reformulation of ISI to submodular-cost covering problem is similar to that of the facility location problem in Section 7 of [19] . According to Lemma 5 in [19] , the following greedy algorithm (Alg. 2) runs in linear time with respect to the total size of all the RR sets and returns an ∆-approximate solution.
Theorem 2. Alg. 2 returns an ∆-approximate solution for the submodular-cost covering formulation of the ISI problem, where ∆ is the maximum size of an RR set (thus, ∆ ≤ VI ), and runs in linear time.
The Alg. 2 starts with formulating the submodular-cost covering problem from VI and R by creating the necessary variables, cost function and constraints as specified previously. A variable xu is initialized to 0 and gets updated in the iterations that node u is in the RR set considering in those iterations. The algorithm passes through all the RR sets Rj ∈ R Blue and makes each of them satisfied in a single iteration in which it calculates the minimum increase θ of the cost function (Line 4-5) that satisfies the constraint. This minimum increase is computed by sequentially trying to raise each variable xu : u ∈ Rj or yj to 1 (covering) and calculating the corresponding cost. Afterwards, it updates each variable of Rj by an amount that makes the cost function increased by θ (Line 6-11) . At the end, it selects the nodes in VI that have value 1 in their variables (Line 12).
Algorithm 3: SISI Algorithm Input: Graph G = (V, E), infection probability β, a set of infected nodes VI , an infection model M and , δ ∈ (0, 1). Output: Initial infected setŜ.
Generate T additional RR sets by Fast-TRIS (or the reverse sampling in [6, 25] for IC, LT models) 
SISI Approximation Algorithm
We will describe the approximation algorithm, named SISI, which combines the three key advanced components: TRIS sampling (Subsec. 3.1), the ∆-approximate submodular-cost covering algorithm (Subsec. 3.2) and a stopping condition in [25] , to solve the ISI problem and returns an ∆ 2 (1− ) 2 -approximate solution with at least (1−δ)-probability (proved in Sec. 4). The description of SISI is given in Alg. 3.
SISI begins with initializing Υ and Λ which will decide the stopping condition (Line 8). The whole algorithm iterates through multiple steps: in the first step, it generates Λ RR sets and add them to R since, to satisfy the stopping condition (Line 7), we need at least Λ RR sets; in subsequent iterations, the algorithm doubles the number of RR sets in R by generating |R| more. In each iteration, it utilizes the submodular-cost covering algorithm to find the candidate setŜ (Line 6) and check whether we have sufficient statistical evidence to achieve a good solution by checking the stopping condition (Line 8). The stopping condition plays a decisive roles in both theoretical solution quality and the complexity of the algorithm. The condition in SISI is derived from the results of optimal sampling for Monte-Carlo estimation studied in [10] . In the next section, we will prove that with this stopping condition, SISI returns an ∆ 2 (1− ) 2 -approximate solution with probability of at least (1 − δ), where , δ are given as inputs. The check in Lines 9-11 is to guarantee small enough and described in Sec. 4. At the end of the algorithm, SISI performs a post-optimization of S which incrementally removes nodes inŜ if that improves the objective function.
ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
We will analyze the approximation guarantee and time complexity of SISI algorithm. In short, we prove that SISI returns an ∆ 2 (1− ) 2 -approximate solution. In the sequel, we will present the time complexity of SISI.
Approximation Guarantee
To prove the approximation guarantee of SISI, we show two intermediate results: 1) with
RR sets whereŜ is the solution returned by SISI,
for short since the M, VI are fixed, all the sets S ⊂ VI are well approximated from R with high probability (Lem. 3) and 2) the actual number of RR sets generated in SISI is greater than
with high probability (Lem. 4). Then, combine these results and the property of submodular-cost covering, we obtain the approximation factor in Theo. 3.
Denote
which is an approximation of E[D(S)]
, achieved from the collection of RR sets R. The following lemma states the approximation quality of a set S ⊆ VI proved in our extended version [4] .
RR sets whereŜ is the solution returned by SISI, then for a set S ⊆ VI ,
where M = 2 k + 1 and k = |VI |.
Lem. 3 states that if we have at least
RR sets then a set S ⊂ VI is approximated within an additive error of √ µŜµS with probability (1 −
δ M
). As a consequence, the next lemma shows that SISI generates at least T * RR set, thus the approximation of S ⊆ VI in SISI is also good.
Lemma 4 (Stopping condition).
The number of RR sets generated by SISI when it stops satisfies,
Based on Lem. 3 and Lem. 4, it is sufficient to prove the ∆ 2 (1− ) 2 -approximation factor of SISI.
(1− ) 2 -approximate solutionŜ with probability of at least (1 − δ) or,
Proof. From Lem. 3, we obtain,
for a particular subset S ⊆ VI if there are at least T * RR sets. Furthermore, Lem. 4 states that SISI generates at least T * RR sets with probability at least δ M . Taking union bound over all subsets S ⊆ VI (note that there are 2 k such subsets) to the above probability and the probability of SISI generating at least T * RR sets in Lem. 4, we achieve
for every set S. Thus, both
and
happen with probability at least (1 − δ). Plugging DR(Ŝ) ≤ ∆DR(S * ) achieved by submodular-cost covering to Eq. 16
then combining with Eq. 15 gives,
This inequality is valid only when 1 − − ∆
OP T E[D(Ŝ)]
> 0 which means < 1/(1 + ∆
). Since is a free parameter, we can choose ≤ 1/(1 + ∆) and satisfy the condition. By considering
as a variable and solve the quadratic inequality with ≤ 1/(1 + ∆), we obtain,
which states the ∆ 2 (1− ) 2 approximation factor of SISI and happens with probability at least (1 − δ).
Time Complexity
This subsection analyzes the time complexity of SISI. We analyze major procedures of the algorithm: 1) submodularcost covering algorithm and 2) generating RR sets.
Submodular-cost covering algorithm
Recall that the total sizes of the generated RR sets is Λ on the average. Since the algorithm for solving the procedure to solve submodular-cost covering problem keeps doubling the number of RR sets after each round,the total complexity of this procedure is bounded loosely by O(Λ 2 ).
Generating RR sets
To determine the time complexity of generating RR sets in SISI, we need analyze the time spent for generating a single RR set (Lemma 1) and the expected number of RR sets. Then multiplying two numbers to get the expected total complexity. The following lemma states the complexity results with the proof in our extended version [4] .
Lemma 5. Let Es be the set of edges connecting nodes in VI to nodes inVI , the complexity of generating RR sets in SISI is O(mΛ∆/|Es|).
Therefore, the overall complexity of SISI is followed by the subsequent theorem. From Theo. 4 , we see that the complexity depends on the number of connections from infected set to the outside world |Es|. That is if there are many infected nodes connected to uninfected nodes, it is easier for SISI to find sources and vice versus, with only few connections, SISI requires more time.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we study the empirical performance of SISI and compare it with the current state-of-the-art methods under the popular SI and IC infection models. We show that SISI outperform the others in terms of detection quality, revealing major of the infection sources. In contrast, the other methods rarely find any true source of the infection.
Experimental Settings

Algorithms compared
Under the SI model, we compare three groups of methods:
• SISI, a relaxed version of SISI, termed SISI-relax, in which we relax the approximation guarantee of SISI by replacing (k ln 2) in Υ by a smaller constant ln(2 × k) and the natural naive Greedy algorithm which iteratively selects one node at a time that commits the largest marginal decrease of symmetric difference. The purpose of designing SISI-relax is to test the empirical performance changes if we have fewer RR sets.
• NETSLEUTH [27] which is the existing best algorithm in general graphs however it fails to provide any guarantee on solution quality.
• Max-Degree based method which ranks node degrees and iteratively selects nodes with highest degree until increasing the symmetric difference as the solution.
Under the IC model, we compare SISI with k-effector [21] and the naive Max-Degree algorithm on IC model. For SISI and SISI-relax, we set the parameters = 0.1, δ = 0.01. For k-effector, k is set to the number of true sources.
Quality measures
To evaluate the solution quality, we adopt three measures:
which is separately calculated with high accuracy ( = 0.01, δ = 0.001) through generating random RR sets as in Subsection 3.1.
• Jaccard distance based QJD [27] :
where E[JDS(VI )] is the average Jaccard distance of S w.r.t. VI and computed by generating many (10000 in our experiments) infection simulations from S and averaging over the Jaccard similarities between the infected sets and VI . S * contains the true sources.
• F1-measure: P R(S) = |S ∩ {true sources}| 2|S| + |S ∩ {true sources}| 2|{true sources}| This accurately captures our ultimate goal of ISI problem: finding both the true sources and the correct number of sources. We also define true source detection rate (%) as 100
Both QJD(S) and P R(S) are ranging in [0, 1] and larger is better. E[D(S, τ, VI )] is nonnegative and smaller is better.
Datasets
For experimental purposes, we select a moderate-size real network -NetHEPT with 15233 nodes and 62796 edges that is actually the largest dataset ever tested on ISI problem. We comprehensively carry experiments on NetHEPT with various numbers of sources {1, 5, 10, 20}, chosen uniformly random, and the propagation time τ is chosen so that the infection sizes reach (or exceed) predefined values in the set {100, 500, 1000}. For each pair of the two values, we generated 10 random test cases with β = 0.05 and then ran each method on these random tests and took the average of each quality measure over 10 such results.
Testing Environments
We implement SISI, SISI-relax, Greedy and Max-Degree methods in C++, NETSLEUTH is in Matlab code and obtained from the authors of [27] . We experiment on a Linux machine with an 8 core 2.2 GHz CPU and 100GB RAM.
Experiments on real network and SI model
Comparing solution quality. The solution quality measured are the true infection sources discovery rate, symmetric difference (our objective) and Jaccard-based distance [27] True source discovery. Fig. 4 reports the F1-measure scores of the tested algorithms. Note that this score has not been used in previous works [27, 24] since previous methods can only find nodes that are within few hops from the sources, but not the sources themselves. As shown in the figure, SISI and SISI-relax have the best performance. More than 50% of the true sources was discovered by SISI and 35% by SISI-relax that exquisitely surpass NETSLEUTH, MaxDegree with 0% and Greedy with roughly 10%. We also present the true source detected rates of different methods in Tab. 3 since this is an important aspect (positive rate) of ISI problem. The table shows accurate detection of SISI and SISI-relax. More than 70% and 50% of true sources are identified by SISI and SISI-relax respectively while NET-SLEUTH and Max-Degree cannot detect any source.
Symmetric difference. Tab. 2 shows the E[D(S, τ, VI )] values where S is the returned solution of each algorithm with various number of true sources and sizes of infection cascades. In all the cases, SISI largely outperforms the other methods and obtains very close values to the true sources. The superiority of SISI against the SISI-relax and Greedy confirms the good solution guarantee of SISI. NETSLEUTH and Max-Degree optimize different criteria, i.e., description length (MDL) and node degree, and thus show poor performance in terms of symmetric difference. SISI-relax is consistently the second best method and preserves very well the performance of SISI.
Jaccard distance. We use QJD(S) as in [27] to evaluate the algorithms and plot the results in Tab. 2. In this case, the closer value of QJD(S) to 1 indicates better solution. In terms of QJD(S), we observe the similar phenomena as measured by symmetric difference that SISI achieve drastically better solution than the others and the results of SISI-relax approach those of SISI very well with much fewer RR sets.
Comparing running time. Fig. 5 illustrates the running time of the algorithms in the previous experiments. We see that SISI is slower than NETSLEUTH and SISI-relax but the differences are minor while it provides by far better accuracy than other algorithms. SISI-relax obtains possibly the best balance among all: faster than NETSLEUTH and providing good solution quality as shown previously.
Experiments on the IC model
Set up. We compare SISI with the dynamic programming algorithm, temporarily called k-effector, in [21] when the infection process follows the IC model. Similar to other experiments, we simulate the infection process under the IC model with 4 different numbers of sources, i.e., 1, 5, 10, 20 and run SISI and k-effector on the resulting cascades. For each setting, we carry 10 simulations and report the average results. Note that the solution for k-effector in [21] requires the number of sources as an additional input parameter and for simplicity, we provide the true number of sources used in the simulation processes. SISI, however, do not require this information. We report the results in Table 4 . Results. It is clear from Table 4 that SISI massively outperforms k-effector in terms of both symmetric difference and true source recovering ability. In summary, for any value of the number of true sources k, SISI always returns solution with symmetric difference equal half of the one returned by k-effector. In terms of true source discovery ability, while k-effector almost detects none of the true sources, SISI consistently achieves the F1-measure of at least 50%.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We present SISI the first approximation algorithm for multiple source detection in general graphs which also works very well in practice. The algorithm can be extended to several other diffusion models and settings with little modification on the sampling procedure as outlined below.
Incomplete Observation [13, 16] . In many cases, we can only observe the states (infected/not infected) for a subset O V of nodes in the network. In those cases, we need to modify the Fast TRIS sampling Algorithm in Line 1 and pick a node u uniformly in O (instead of V ) and allow the sources to be from VI or unknown state nodes.
However, the SISI cannot be directly adapted to nonprogessive models in which a node can switch from an infected state into uninfected state. Thus approximation algorithm for source detection in non-progressive models leaves an open question and is among our future work.
